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1 Introduction
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July 6, 2005
Does the market provide suﬃcient
employment protection?
The desirability of existing employment protection legislation (EPL) is still
subject to debate among economists. Some blame the poor performance
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This paper examines the role of employment protection when rms
learn over time about the value of the match. Positive severance pay-
ments are useful instruments to achieve eﬃcient layoﬀ decisions and
smooth labor income proles, if rms and workers could commit to
future wages. However, when future bargaining over wages cannot be
prevented, layoﬀs are too frequent as a consequence of the asymmetry
of learning between rms and their employees. Mandatory severance
payments are not a remedy for this ineﬃciency. Instead, a Pigouvian
tax/subsidy scheme will correct the ineﬃciency by enhancing emplo-
ment protection.
JEL Classication numbers: J41, J65.
Key words: severance payments, layoﬀs, experimentation, employ-
ment protection.
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See, for instance, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and OECD (1994).
These papers are reminiscent of the old literature on implicit contracts. See Rosen
(1985) for a survey. In contrast, Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) by calibrating a general
equilibrium model with costly search and risk-averse workers conclude that most of the
eﬃciency gains from severance payments are associated to the reduction in search costs
rather than to the smoothing of consumption ows.
A key assumption is that disciplinary dismissals and those caused by shocks can be
perfectly distinguished. In the real world disciplinary dismissals are declared unfair quite
frequently. Thus, severance payments may distort incentives, raise wages, and reduce
employment (Galdón-Sánchez and Güell, 2003)
For instance, Pissarides (2001), page 156, claims that inclusion of severance payments
in private contracts would not be enforceable.
(at least relative to the US) of most European labor markets on EPL and
other labor market institutions. In particular, the low level of labor ows
observed in many European economies is often interpreted as the outcome
of EPL interfering with the eﬃcient functioning of markets. However,
others have a much more favorable view of EPL. In particular, recent liter-
ature has suggested that the presence of various types of market frictions
lead to excessive layoﬀs, which provides an eﬃciency rationale for employ-
ment protection policies. Several types of frictions have been considered,
including the absence of private insurance against idiosyncratic labor in-
come risk (Pissarides, 2001, and Bertola, 2004) and rms idiosyncratic
shocks in eﬃciency wage models (Saint Paul, 1995, and Fella, 2000) .
In our reading of this second strand of the literature, we nd a failure to
oﬀer a rationale for employment protection. Indeed, in the models
analyzed in all these articles, rms and workers would nd it in their interest
to include severance payments in their private contracts. Thus, public
intervention would be redundant, in the sense that market transactions
would incorporate the right amount of employment protection, if agents
could use severance clauses. In most of these papers, this possibility is
simply ruled out. Then, mandatory severance payments are motivated
not only by the presence of market frictions but also (and crucially) by the
existence of a contracting failure: for some unspecied reason, the set of
feasible contracts is severely restricted.
We nd this approach unsatisfactory. It is by no means rare to nd
in the real world employment protection clauses in private contracts. For
instance, workers not covered by common labor market regulations (such
as managers or professional sports people) are often protected against rm-
initiated separations by contracts that include large severance payments.
2
56
7
5
6
7
There is substantial empirical evidence suggesting a negative relationship between
the hazard rate of employment separations and job tenure. Two learning processes can
explain such a phenomenon: Learning-by-doing and learning about match quality, since
in both cases the average productivity of workers increases with tenure. Nagypàl (2000)
uses a French dataset to distinguish between these two possible explanations and nds
that learning about match quality clearly dominates.
The asymmetry of information on the realization of the match value is crucial, since
it causes ineﬃcient separations. Nagypàl (2002) studies a model where both the rm and
the worker learn over time about the quality of the match and bargain eﬃciently about
wages (eﬃcient separations). A tax on layoﬀs reduces productivity and welfare, since it
distorts separation decisions.
Burguet, Caminal, and Matutes (2002) studied the optimal contracting arrangements
Moreover, several authors have reported that in some industries a substan-
tial fraction of collective bargaining agreements include severance payments
over and above mandatory levels (See Booth, 1987; Pencavel, 1991; and
Lorences et al., 1995, for the UK, US, and Spain, respectively). Thus, ruling
out employment protection clauses in private contracts seems at odds with
this evidence. Real world contracts are likely to be subject to various types
of restrictions and hence they may turn out to be highly incomplete. But
apparently they can easily contain employment protection clauses, includ-
ing severance payment provisions. In fact, we can interpret the literature
mentioned above as an explanation of the demand for privateemplo yment
protection rather than a justication of public intervention. In summary,
it is probably fair to say that the literature has not provided a proper
motivation for public employment protection.
In this paper we take a step in this direction. Firstly, we investigate
circumstances under which the market outcome is characterized by exces-
sive layoﬀs or, equivalently, insuﬃcient employment protection. Secondly,
we investigate the optimal form of public intervention. The key element in
our discussion, the key friction so to speak, is the existence, at the time of
forming a match between a rm and a (group of ) worker(s), of uncertainty
about the value of a particular match. This creates the need for (and
the rents from) experimentation. This experimentation is characterized by
information asymmetries. In particular, we postulate that the employer
learns about the value of the match more than the employee does. Then,
for reasons that are analogous to those found in the implicit contracts lit-
erature, equilibrium contracts would be characterized by constant wage
proles and positive severance payments if workers and rms could commit
to future wages. However, this commitment, although convenient for a
3
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in a model where rms learn about workers quality. The aim of that paper was to analyze
the eﬀect of the information structure on the optimal combination of diﬀerent types of
switching costs (layoﬀ costs versus penalties on quits). In contrast, the goal of the current
paper is to understand the eﬀect of the contract length on the eﬃciency of layoﬀs and the
role of public intervention. Although the two models diﬀer substantially, they share the
insight that, under some circumstances, a positive severance payment may be needed to
guarantee ex-post eﬃciency.
benchmark model, is probably an unrealistic assumption. In reality, em-
ployees can always try to renegotiate wages in future times in the hope
that their match has turned out to be of high value. Thus, independently
of the clauses workers and rms include in their contracts, wages are at
some point renegotiated under asymmetric information, and the result we
should expect is excessive layoﬀs (Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983). This
is the market failure that justies public intervention.
Our model is highly stylized but provides some basic insights that we
consider robust, in particular with respect to public employment protection,
our second question of interest. If privately agreed severance payments are
enforceable then it is hard to make a case in favor of mandatory sever-
ance payments. In the absence of non-pecuniary externalities, exogenously
setting a oor to the level of transfers between rms and workers cannot
help. Such a policy simply imposes a restriction on the set of feasible con-
tracts. This does not imply that there is no room for of public
intervention. Indeed, what is needed is the direct intervention of a third
party that receives or makes payments, and not only a regulation of private
relations. In particular, we show that a tax-subsidy scheme can restore
full eﬃciency. A tax on layoﬀs reduces rms dismissal incentives without
raising workersoutside options.
We undertake the analysis in an overlapping generations model with
innitely lived, competitive rms that use labor in a decreasing returns
to scale technology. Workers are untested when young, but their match-
specic productivity is known by their employers by the time they get old.
Workers can borrow and save, but capital markets are imperfect. Workers
prefer smooth consumption patterns, although we do not need to assume
risk aversion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
presents the model. As a benchmark, in Section 3 we analyze in the solution
to this model if parties could commit to future wages. Firms and work-
ers would then be able to sign contracts that would guarantee an eﬃcient
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equilibrium. Section 4 contains the main results of the paper. There we an-
alyze the model with all the assumptions, including the crucial one: parties
cannot commit to future wages. Equilibrium is characterized by excessive
layoﬀs, but eﬃciency can be restored by a tax/subsidy scheme and not by
mandated severance payments. Finally, Section 5 contains some concluding
remarks. A number of formal proofs and extensions are contained in the
Appendix.
The purpose of this paper is to study private and public employment protec-
tion in a parsimonious model that emphasizes rmslearning about match
quality. Thus, the model abstracts from all other interesting aspects of the
labor market, including mobility costs, market power, demand shocks, and
labor market institutions other than EPL. We consider a partial equilib-
rium model with innitely-lived rms and overlapping generations of work-
ers who live for two periods. The size (mass) of generations is constant over
time, and denoted by , and the mass of rms is assumed to be .
Firms in each period produce output using labor as the only input,
according to the production function where is a twice dif-
ferentiable function, with and is the total mass of labor
employed, measured in eﬃciency units, in period . Firms are small with
respect to both the labor and the output market (whose price is normalized
to one), although each rm hires a large number of workers, so that the
realized eﬃciency units of employed workers (see below how uncertainty is
introduced) coincide ex-post with the expected number of eﬃciency units
with probability one. Firms maximize the expected present value of prots,
and their discount factor is
Worker (of any one generation) is able to supply eﬃciency units of
labor to rm . All are realizations of independent and identically dis-
tributed random variables over the interval according to the density
function with c.d.f. . The value of the match, , is constant
over time. The independence assumption allows us to dispose of the sub-
scripts when we analyze decisions concerning a single rm-worker pair.
For economy of notation, we assume Let be the inverse of
the hazard rate, i.e., . We assume that which is a
standard assumption in the literature on optimal contracting under asym-
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Hence, our utility specication is in the spirit of Epstein and Zin (1989), in the sense
of disentangling intertemporal substitution and risk aversion.
Very often intertemporal models of the labor market assume that workers are excluded
from nancial markets ( See Bertola (2004) for a recent example. In our
case we simply require a small interest rate diﬀerential in order to break the multiplicity
of optimal contracts, as discussed below.
metric information and implies that is not excessively negative. The
realization of is only observed by the incumbent rm after employing the
worker for one period. Ex-post eﬃciency requires that a worker that has
worked for a rm when young is retained if and only if . Indeed, old
workers stay in the market for only one more period, and their expected
supply of labor, measured in eﬃciency units, in any rm other than their
former employers equals .
The quality of the match is only observed by the rm after one period
of employment. Thus, the rm can experiment with young workers and
dismiss those who do not perform satisfactorily.
Since below we focus on stationary equilibria, then the only reference
to the time dimension that matters is the workers age. Thus, a subscript
will refer to young workers (rst period of their life) and a subscript will
refer to old workers (second period of their life).
Workers have identical preferences. The utility of a representative worker
is given by:
(1)
with , and denotes the of consumption in
period . Thus, the concave utility function captures the consumption
smoothing motive, which will play some role in the model in combination
with capital market imperfections. However, this smoothing motive does
not imply here that workers are risk averse. In other words, workers wish to
smooth their consumption across periods but not necessarily across states
of nature. Implicit in this utility function is the assumption that workers
labor supply is inelastic. Finally, we assume that workers hold zero nancial
wealth at the beginning of their lifetimes.
Capital markets are not perfect. Let us denote the discount factor
associated with workers lending and borrowing as and respectively.
We assume that . In other words, workers face a lower lending
rate and a higher borrowing rate than rms.
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3.1 Market eﬃciency and severance payments
3 The benchmark case: full commitment to
future wages
As we have already mentioned wages and payments in general cannot explicitly be a
function of . The information structure also implies that the separation decision must be
taken by the rm. Since payments can only depend on observables, and the only observable
between period 1 and 2 is the separation decision, we are considering a suﬃcient set of
instruments to span the range of all possible contracts.
Finally, we assume that both output and labor markets are perfectly
competitive and assume away any costs of reallocating workers.
As mentioned in the Introduction, we are interested in understanding the
consequences of asymmetric learning on the outcomes of labor markets and
on public employment protection when workers can try to renegotiate their
wages throughout their employment relationship with rms. However, it
will be useful to consider rst the benchmark case where parties have no
restriction on committing to the entire sequence of wages. Thus, the only
restriction on contracting that we assume for the moment is the conse-
quence of asymmetric learning: payments cannot depend (explicitly) on
performance.
In each period a typical rm retains some of the young workers hired in
the previous period and dismisses some others. It also hires displaced old
workers and young workers. The labor inputs of all these workers are
perfect substitutes, from the rms point of view. Nevertheless, rms take
into account that they can experiment with young workers: learn their
types and reallocate them later if necessary.
Old workers that change employer are hired at a wage, for their
only remaining period of activity. In contrast, in this section contracts
with young workers may stipulate a sequence of wages . We also
allow the contract to include a severance pay, , to be paid in case of a
layoﬀ. Workers are allowed to quit and quitting penalties are ruled out
for the usual reasons. An old worker can obtain a wage in the market,
and therefore the no quitting restriction on contracts is which in
equilibrium is not binding.
7
s

11
11
1 2
2
( ) ( )
+
{ }
{ }

s,
w
w ,w , s
q
s
w t , s t .
q
q
q
qw s w
Stage 1: Labor market
Stage 2: Production
Stage 3: Payments and consumption
In fact, in the latter case the equilibrium value of would be higher. One of the
advantages of the formulation that we adopted is that layoﬀ decisions involve only con-
temporaneous variables, so that we do not need to play around with discount factors.
In each period the sequence of events is the following:
a) . Firms take hiring and ring decisions, and
workers decide whether to quit. Fired workers receive and hired workers
are oﬀered diﬀerent types of contracts depending on age: to old workers
and to young workers.
b) . All workers supply their eﬃciency units, and
rms obtain the output and learn the value of of their workers
c) . Wages are paid according to
their contracts, workers visit nancial markets and nally they consume.
Note that the timing of the game implies that laid oﬀ workers receive
the severance payment in their second period. It is easy to check that if
is collected in the rst period, results would be qualitatively identical.
Moreover, letting workers collect their severance pay in the second period
is probably a more natural assumption. In the continuous time version
of the model, the contract would specify wages and severance payments
as a function of time: Wages are continuously paid, but the
severance payment is only collected at the time of a layoﬀ. Hence, wages
can be enjoyed throughout the employment relationship, but the severance
payment will be enjoyed only after the relationship is over. Our formulation
is analogous.
We focus on stationary and symmetric competitive equilibria. Thus,
prices and allocations are constant over time and all rms employ a pool of
workers with identical age and productivity composition. Moreover, rms
and workers take market prices and utility levels associated to contracts as
given. Firms take their hiring and ring decisions in order to maximize the
present value of prots, and workers choose their employer as well as their
savings/ borrowing decisions in order to maximize their expected utility.
Finally, markets clear.
We rst analyze rms dismissal and hiring decisions. In each period,
when the labor market opens, rms know the realizations of of the young
employees they hired in the previous period and decide who stays and who
leaves. Workers with a particular level of will be laid oﬀ if replacing them
is cheaper. More specically, workers with will be laid oﬀ if:
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The right hand side is the cost of keeping the worker. The left hand side
is the cost of replacing that worker with old workers, whose market price
per eﬃciency unit is . Therefore, ex-post a worker is laid oﬀ if
where the cut oﬀ depends on the terms of the workers contract and the
market wage for old workers:
(2)
The condition is not only necessary but also suﬃcient if the fol-
lowing conditions also hold: (i) rms hire new workers every period, and
(ii) rms are indiﬀerent between hiring young and old workers. Since we
only consider equilibria where all rms labor force have the same age com-
position, then (i) is clearly satised (generational turnover plus reallocation
of old workers across rms). Condition (ii) must also hold if markets are
to clear. Indeed, if rms strictly prefer to hire workers of a particular age
then the more expensive generation will be in excess supply. Therefore, in
equilibrium a worker is laid oﬀ if and only if where is given by
equation 2.
In a stationary equilibrium, the indiﬀerence between hiring old and new
workers (arbitrage condition), taking 2 into account, is given by:
(3)
The left hand side is the wage of old workers per eﬃciency unit. The
numerator of the right hand side is the expected present value of payments
to a young worker and the denominator is the expected present value of the
eﬃciency units to be supplied by a young worker. That is, the right hand
side is the expected payment per unit of eﬃciency supplied by a young
worker.
One fundamental element of our model is the existence and management
of experimentation. Firms experiment with young workers and, when the
outcome of the experiment is not satisfactory, workers are dismissed and
nd new jobs. This means that, measured in eﬃciency units, the supply
of labor that is expected from a young worker is larger than 1 per period.
Note that since markets are perfectly competitive, workers appropriate the
returns of this experimentation. Indeed, according to equation 3 rms pay
w for each eﬃciency unit (in expectation) provided by both old and young
workers.
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Note that ex-post eﬃciency implies that the equilibrium contract is renegotiation-
proof.
An equilibrium contract for young workers involves full
wage smoothing and eﬃcient layoﬀs, i.e., Moreover,
laid oﬀ workers receive a positive severance pay,
Given , an equilibrium contract for young workers should
maximize the (life-cycle, expected) utility of workers subject to 3 given 2,
and given the optimal private choice of savings resulting from the contract
and the realization of the random variable. If, alternatively, workers were
oﬀered contracts that satisfy 3 but do not maximize their utility, then rms
could nd a contract that oﬀers workers the same level of utility to young
workers and reduce the cost of each eﬃciency unit below . Hence, this
cannot be part of an equilibrium. Thus, the objective of an equilibrium
contract is to achieve the best combination of (a) an eﬃcient allocation of
workers and (b) smooth labor income (smooth workers consumption, using
the most eﬃcient borrowing and saving instrument). In fact, in this case
those two goals can be achieved simultaneously. Indeed, ex-post eﬃciency
implies that which is equivalent to:
Labor income smoothing implies that:
If we plug these two conditions into the arbitrage condition 3 then we
nd that these two goals are achieved if and only if:
All this discussion is summarized in the following proposition (the proof
can be found in the Appendix):
These results can also be explained in terms of how experimentation
rents are transferred to workers. Given , competition implies that young
workers are oﬀered contracts that remunerate their expected supply of labor
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at this rate. Thus, young workers receive the expected value of experimen-
tation rents, which evaluated in second period terms equals:
Given the imperfections in capital markets, workers strictly prefer con-
tracts with smooth labor income, which implies that expected income in
both periods must be above In particular, expected second period labor
income, , must be above . If , then
this would require , which would imply ineﬃcient layoﬀ decisions
(equation 2). Therefore, eﬃcient separations require a positive severance
payment.
A consequence of eﬃciency and equation 2 is the following result.
: The equilibrium contract provides full insurance (in spite
of universal risk neutrality) in the sense that the workers second period
income is constant across states of nature:
In this model, ex-post eﬃciency and insurance go hand in hand when
future wages can be contracted.
Workers consumption smoothing is attained in this model through the
most eﬃcient channel, which is the contract with the employer. If capital
markets were perfect, this would not be the only way to attain the same
goal.
Under perfect capital markets the contract
characterized in Proposition 1 is still optimal given . However, it is not
the only one. In particular, there is a contract with zero severance payments
and a decreasing wage sequence that is also optimal. If there
are also multiple solutions but in all of them
See Appendix. Note that the result in Proposition 1 does not hinge on
ruling out bonding (increasing wage sequences). Contracts with positive
severance payments are strictly better than contracts with zero severance
payments if workers dislike decreasing wages. In other words, it is suﬃcient
that workers face a small transaction cost when lending.
If the legal environment was hostile to the presence of severance pay-
ments clauses in private contracts, then smooth labor income would be
incompatible with eﬃcient layoﬀs. More specically, in our framework if
severance payments are forbidden then under the equilibrium contract there
are excessive layoﬀs and the wage sequence is increasing:
Under the constraint that , the equilibrium contract
is characterized by .
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3.2 A few remarks on robustness
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The rest of the equilibrium equations, which are needed to endogenize
are labor demand (prot maximization), and labor market clearing.
The demand for labor is the result of static prot maximization and is
characterized by the familiar condition:
(4)
Market clearing in any period is given by:
(5)
The right hand side, the supply of labor, is the sum of three terms. The
rst is the amount of labor in eﬃciency units supplied by young workers
(each supplying one unit on average) in the period. A proportion
of the young workers hired in the previous period are retained by their
employers, and each one supplies units of labor in expectation.
Thus, the second term is the amount of labor in eﬃciency units supplied by
retained old workers. The rest of the young workers of the previous period,
that is, a proportion of the old workers of today, are dismissed and
then hired by new employers. On average, they supply 1 eﬃciency unit of
labor. That is the third term.
Combining 4 and 5 we have that is a non monotonic function of ,
decreasing if and increasing otherwise ( reaches a minimum at
.
Summarizing, under long-run commitment the market delivers full eﬃ-
ciency, both ex-ante (full employment of young workers) and ex-post (the
reallocation of workers is also eﬃcient). Moreover, workers enjoy the right
temporal consumption prole. As a result, there is no room for eﬃciency-
motivated public intervention.
The model we have just discussed is a very stylized one. We next com-
ment on how some of the assumptions can be relaxed without major con-
sequences. First, the assumption that workers live for two periods is con-
venient but by no means essential.
: All the main insights of Proposition 1 extend very easily to
the case of workers who live for periods, and there is uncertainty
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The case of imperfect capital markets is slightly more complicated analytically, since
in that case there is a trade-oﬀ between ex-post eﬃciency and consumption smoothing.
Booth and Chatterji (1989) present a model of relation-specic human capital invest-
ment where severance payments are part the equilibrium contract. Our remark points
out that the key feature of their model is the uncertainty concerning the workers outside
opportunity cost and not the sharing of rm specic investment.
On the other hand, if rms can compete for retained workers then second period wages
must be very high in order to discourage quits, which would tend to raise above one.
about the timing of the realization of . In such a case, severance payments
increase with seniority and are always positive.
See Appendix. The value of a worker increases with the number of
remaining periods of her active life. Since the value of experimentation
is transferred to the worker, the utility of a new employment decreases
with age. As a result the eﬃcient cut-oﬀ point, , decreases over time. A
contract can still achieve both allocation eﬃciency and wage smoothing, by
stipulating a sequence of severance payments that increases over time.
Second, we have assumed that only the incumbent rm learns the quality
of the match and that workers outside opportunities are deterministic.
If we relax either of these features, and we do not expand contracting
possibilities (in particular, if we do not allow penalties on quits) then it
is not possible to achieve eﬃcient separations. However, the qualitative
characteristics of the equilibrium contract remain roughly unchanged, even
under perfect capital markets. In order to illustrate this point in the
Appendix we analyze the case where the outside wage that a particular
worker can obtain after separation is and is random. We show that
in this case, the optimal contract involves a positive severance payment:
Under perfect capital markets and uncertainty concerning
the outside wage that a particular individual can obtain in the second period
the optimal contract involves
Finally, we could also consider the case that s are positively corre-
lated across rms, in which case layoﬀs convey a stigma for the worker.
It turns out that in this case it is important whether contracts are or are
not observable to outside rms. If they are observable then laid-oﬀ workers
experience a utility loss (see Burguet, Caminal and Matutes, 2002), but
the other features of the optimal contract remain unchanged. If contracts
are unobservable then severance payments are higher and separations are
excessively infrequent ( ).
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4 Wage bargaining
Thus, our model has nothing to do with the existence of market power in the labor
market, which is typically associated to unions and the structure of collective bargaining.
Union-rm bargaining tends to create a gap between the marginal product of labor and
the workers reservation wage. As a result, severance payments may also help to improve
the eﬃciency of employment decisions. See Booth (1995).
In a continuous time version of the model, workers live for units of time. Incomplete
commitment implies that fully binding contracts have a shorter horizon, . Thus, a
contract would include for Our formulation is the natural analog
in a two-period framework.
In the previous section we assumed that rms and workers could commit
to future wages. Such commitment capacity could perhaps be achieved
by writing long-run contracts, although it is not obvious how parties can
commit in practice not to renegotiate the terms of the contract. More-
over, explicit contracts with a time horizon of more than two or three years
are rarely observed in the real world. Alternatively, rms may attempt
to develop commitment devices based essentially on reputation, like wage
setting rules or promotion systems, to make their future wage oﬀers credi-
ble. Firms concerns about their reputation may limit the ability of workers
to pursue an improvement in their wages during their careers. However,
whatever means rms have at their disposal, the assumption of full com-
mitment to future wages in the benchmark model of the previous section
seems very extreme. We turn to the analysis of the model incorporating the
assumption that parties cannot ex-ante commit to future wages. In par-
ticular, workers cannot be prevented from trying their hand at improving
their salaries during their employment relationship.
Formally, contracts for young workers do not include their second pe-
riod wage with their current employer, . Thus, at the beginning of
their second period (when the labor market opens) workers bargain (under
asymmetric information) with their employers. In particular, this bargain-
ing is about how to share the possible diﬀerence between the value of the
worker for the incumbent rm and the workers outside opportunity cost
. Contracts can still include severance payments, . In fact,
there is no room to renegotiate the transfer in case of separation, indepen-
dently of the information available about the value of the match.
Diﬀerent bargaining procedures result in diﬀerent outcomes. Next we
analyze a simple, extreme case, where the worker (the uninformed party)
makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the rm (the informed party). This is to
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Under bargaining there is no distinction between quits and layoﬀs: separations occur
when parties do not reach an agreement.
keep the analysis in its simplest terms. Later in this section, we will discuss
alternative procedures and show that the qualitative results we are about
to present, in particular the existence of excessive layoﬀs, are generic. For
the reader familiar with the literature on bargaining, and then with the
work of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) this should be apparent.
Thus, assume that rms and workers can contract on ( ), i.e., the wage
for the current period and the severance payment that would be paid to
the worker in case of separation. At the beginning of the second period
the worker makes a take-it-or-leave-it, second-period wage demand, to
her fully informed incumbent rm. If the rm does not accept it, then the
worker leaves the job and collects the severance payment, . Faced with
a wage demand of one of its employees, the rms acceptance rule is
unchanged: it accepts if and only if where is given by equation
2. The only diﬀerence is that is not part of a contract, but a decision of
the worker. Taking this decision rule into account, the worker chooses
in order to maximize the expected second period consumption,
(6)
The rst order condition of this maximization problem characterizes the
equilibrium value of , and can be written as
(7)
Since the inverse of the hazard rate, is strictly positive, then the
solution of equation 7, is higher than one; i.e., the cut-oﬀ point is above
the eﬃcient level (excessive layoﬀs). Also, notice that is independent
of and . Old workers will attempt to obtain from their employers
a wage over and above their reservation value . This reservation
value coincides with the employers cost of replacing a worker whose has
turned out to be equal to . Thus, the rm strictly prefers to separate from
such worker. That is, . Thus, from equation 2, the outcome of the
bargaining process will be:
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If contracts can only stipulate then separations oc-
cur with an ineﬃciently high probability, , and as a result employment
(in eﬃciency units) and output are lower than eﬃcient.
always
unless
never
(8)
Let us now turn to the beginning of the relationship, when rms and
young workers sign contracts . Since is independent of the terms
of the contract, the optimal contract will still imply smooth labor income:
(9)
Thus, taking as given, in equilibrium parties sign contracts
that lead to bargaining outcomes , which are characterized by equa-
tions 3, 7, 8, and 9. As in the benchmark case, the model is closed with
equations 4 and 5; that is rms demand for eﬃciency units of labor and
market clearing. The diﬀerence here is that workers are ineﬃciently allo-
cated when old, and hence the gains from experimentation are lower than
in the benchmark model, is lower and is higher.
This discussion is summarized in the following proposition.
Excessive layoﬀs are a consequence of (asymmetric information) bar-
gaining between rms and their employees. As we mentioned above, we
have chosen a simple, yet extreme form of bargaining. It is extreme in
the sense that it gives all the ex-post bargaining power to the worker (but
all the information advantage to the rm). A rst question we need to
address is how robust our qualitative results are with respect to the bar-
gaining procedure. In particular, how general is the existence of excessive
layoﬀs (insuﬃciency of employment protection). We claim that indeed ex-
cessive layoﬀs are a quite robust consequence of wage bargaining. In a
very inuential paper, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) have shown that
bargaining under two-way asymmetric information will result , and
independently of the bargaining mechanism, in insuﬃcient trade. We are
considering a one-way asymmetric information scenario: only the rm has
private information. Yet, it is clear that the same result applies to this
model the rm has all the bargaining power ex-post. That is, un-
less workers are able to obtain a salary above , their fall back
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Remark 6: meaningful
negative
Remark 7:
For instance, this scenario would correspond to a situation where the rm can make
a take-it-or-leave-it wage oﬀer to its employees for their second period in the rm.
The non contractibility of aﬀects the equilibrium value of through diﬀerent chan-
nels. On the one hand, for a given , is lower than under full commitment. The reason
is that is both an instrument for transferring experimentation rents to the worker (part
of her compensation package) and also part of the fall-back option in the second period
bargaining. Experimentation rents are lower than under commitment, which calls for a re-
duction in the workers compensation. Also, consumption smoothing requires a moderate
, which can only be obtained by reducing the workers fall-back option (lower ). On
the other hand, less eﬃcient separations induce lower supply of labor in eﬃciency units,
which raises the short term wage, and increases the total compensation of a young
worker (higher ). Obviously, if the demand for labor is suﬃciently elastic the rst eﬀect
dominates and the level of is lower than under commitment.
option; put in other words, unless workers do not eﬀectively have the possi-
bility of bargaining over salaries with the rm. Indeed, if the rm has all
the bargaining power ex-post, it can credibly oﬀer to young workers what
we found was the optimal contract under full commitment: .
Employees will not be able to obtain a wage above this level, and the rm
would not be able to retain workers by oﬀering a second period wage below
even if the contract did not include that . In summary,
If future wages are subject to any type of ne-
gotiation, that is, if employees get a wage above with positive
probability, then the market outcome will be characterized by excessive-
layoﬀs independently of the bargaining procedure.
See Appendix.
With wage bargaining between employers and employees, retained work-
ers obtain a wage above even in the absence of positive severance pay-
ments, and then their second period expected revenue include rents from
experimentation. That is, and as opposed to what happened in our bench-
mark model, severance payments are not the only channel through which
workers receive experimentation rents when old. A positive severance pay-
ment, on the other hand, aﬀects (amplies) the wage that employees will
demand in the second period. In fact, even with no severance payments
these wage demands may be excessive as compared to the experimentation
rents, and then equilibrium may call for severance payments.
The following remark is concerned with the feasibility of negative sev-
erance payments.
If only non negative severance payments are allowed, then
for some distribution functions of this restriction is binding and hence in
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5 Optimal public intervention
Any measure that does not imply transfers from or to third parties would be covered
by the theorem of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), and then we should expect exces-
sive layoﬀs if the worker is to obtain any positive surplus from bargaining with positive
probability.
equilibrium we have that .
See the Appendix. In these cases, consumption smoothing cannot be
attained by adjusting the pattern of wages, and . Thus, workers
would have to rely on borrowing in the less eﬃcient capital market, if they
want to atten their consumption pattern.
Finally, if severance payments are not contractible ( , then if our
previous equilibrium implied positive severance payments, workers will have
to resort to saving, if they still want to atten their consumption
pattern.
If workers borrow or save through the capital market, ei-
ther because severance payments are non contractible or because the non
negativity constraint is binding, separations will still occur too often.
Previous subsections have shown that layoﬀs are excessively frequent (there
is too little private employment protection) due to the inability of parties
to commit to future terms of trade in the presence of asymmetric learning.
This raises the question of whether public intervention can improve market
performance. Given the nature of the market failure, welfare enhancing
policies require that rms and workers make payments to or receive them
from a third party. This is where a public authority can make a diﬀerence
by means of a Pigouvian tax/subsidy scheme.
Consider a combination of a tax on layoﬀs, , and an employment sub-
sidy, . We require that the scheme balances the budget. The rms ring
decision must now consider the extra cost that the tax represents: besides
paying the severance payment , a rm has to pay the tax if negotiations
with the employee break down, i.e., if a separation occurs. Then, rms
will not accept a wage demand from workers with , where this
threshold is given by:
(10)
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w , sIf contracts can only stipulate , then there exists a
tax/subsidy scheme that implements the rst best, i.e., eliminates ineﬃcient
layoﬀs, without distorting workers intertemporal allocation of consumption,
and hence increasing welfare.
The workers ex-post problem is not aﬀected, although she now takes
this new layoﬀ decision rule into account. Thus, substituting this rule into
the rst order condition for the optimal oﬀer, , we have:
(11)
Note that, since we are assuming that the inverse of the hazard rate,
, is a monotonically decreasing function, then for given , is de-
creasing in The arbitrage (cost minimization) condition 3 becomes:
(12)
Finally, the balanced budget condition is .
Suppose that takes the value that prevailed in the equilibrium of
the benchmark model (Section 4), . Then, from equation 11 we
can compute the value of that implies that that is
This determines (equation 10) the optimal wage demand:
Anticipating this behavior, parties sign contracts that aim at labor
income smoothing, which implies that Plugging the balanced
budget condition, the eﬃciency condition, the optimal wage demand, and
the rst period wage that guarantees labor income smoothing, into arbi-
trage condition 12 gives the equilibrium value of which is units lower
than in the benchmark model, . As a result, expected second
period labor income, is the same as rst pe-
riod labor income, and identical to the level obtained in the benchmark
model. Finally, since the level of experimentation rents are the same as in
the benchmark model, will also be the same. Hence, it is possible
to implement an eﬃcient allocation of workers without distorting workers
consumption prole.
The next proposition summarizes this discussion:
The tax decreases the incentives of rms to break oﬀ negotiations with-
out increasing the workers threat point. It does so by introducing a gap
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There is still a third possibility, which is that , but workers do not borrow in
equilibrium. That is, workers would like to borrow , but are not willing
to borrow in the more expensive capital market. In this case, even a low tax rate has
rst order eﬀects both on eﬃciency and consumption smoothing, and then the net welfare
eﬀect of this intervention has an ambiguous sign.
If negative values of are not feasible, and such a constraint is binding, then in the
optimal policy the worker must pay some share of the tax on separations. This may look
implausible. In order to analyze this issue rigorously we need to explicitly model the
reasons behind restricting to non-negative severance payments.
Again, more eﬃciency does not have to translate into a higher wage bill. If work-
ers welfare is the goal, this labor market intervention may need a complementary, more
standard redistributive public intervention.
between what a rm pays and what a worker receives. This sort of third
party intervention is what is needed to guarantee eﬃciency under asymmet-
ric information. Excessive layoﬀs call for public employment protection,
but this employment protection is not guaranteed by only restricting the
contracting possibilities of parties.
The result in Proposition 3 assumes no constraint on the sign of .
If negative severance payments are not allowed (and such a constraint is
binding), and in equilibrium , a tax/subsidy scheme can still restore
ex-post eﬃciency, but makes it more costly for workers to smooth their
consumption. Thus,
: If is binding and workers borrow in equilibrium with-
out intervention, then the proposed tax/subsidy scheme cannot implement
the rst best, but a suﬃciently small tax/subsidy still improves welfare.
See Appendix. A tax raises , since the worker faces a lower prob-
ability of being laid oﬀ for a given wage demand, and a subsidy raises .
Consumption smoothing then calls for a lower If this is not possible then
there is a trade-oﬀ between productive eﬃciency and consumption smooth-
ing. If the tax is such that then the expected consumption in the
second period is too high and consumption in the rst period is too low.
However, if workers are smoothing their consumption (imperfectly) by bor-
rowing in the capital market, a small tax/subsidy will have a second order
eﬀect on consumption smoothing and a rst order eﬀect on eﬃciency. This
explains the unambiguous remark above.
In most European countries the typical instrument for employment pro-
tection consists of mandating a minimum level of severance payments. How-
ever,
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6 Concluding remarks
In fact, if we assumed an elastic supply of labor, this lower utility of workers would
translate into a lower level of employment.
: In the model in this section mandatory severance payments
cannot improve welfare.
In the absence of transaction costs, a binding, minimum level of sev-
erance payments cannot aﬀect rms layoﬀ decisions and hence can only
make things worse, i.e., raise second period wage at the cost of a lower
rst period wage (distort the workers consumption prole). This results
in lower utility for the worker, with no eﬀect on the level of employment
(measured in eﬃciency units).
When the quality of the matches between workers and their employers is
uncertain and is only revealed through experience, labor contracts have to
address the problem of how to share the resulting experimentation rents.
This is the issue analyzed in this paper, under the assumption that the
employer has an advantage in observing the quality of the match, but com-
petes with other rms to attract new workers. In this context, contracts
should pursue possibly conicting goals. One of these goals is to provide
the right incentives for workers reallocation (dismissals). The second one
is to provide an adequate labor income prole, when workers have a prefer-
ence for consumption smoothing and capital markets are less than perfect.
We have shown how these two goals could be made compatible if contracts
could stipulate positive severance payments and also the sequence of wages
throughout the employment relationship.
When rms and workers cannot commit to future wages, the two goals
are no longer compatible. In this case, negotiations under incomplete infor-
mation will result in excessive dismissals (too little employment protection).
Equilibrium contracts may still include positive severance payments, but
nevertheless labor relations will break down too often.
This ineﬃciency is due to a friction, the information asymmetry, which
does not cause any non-pecuniary externality. Therefore, a public inter-
vention that limits itself to restricting the set of feasible contracts cannot
improve eﬃciency. Thus, mandatory severance payments, which simply
provide a oor for the terms of contracts that employers and employees can
21
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Given a young worker chooses the optimal level of savings, in
order to maximize:
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where:
where if and if From the rst order condition,
if stands for expected second period consumption):
(13)
The optimal contract consists of choosing in order to maxi-
mize 1 subject to 3. Suppose then by the envelope theorem and if
we denote the workers utility under optimal savings by , the rst order
conditions are (using 13):
(14)
(15)
Note that Hence, these two rst order conditions cannot hold
simultaneously. It must be the case that under the optimal contract
In this case the optimal contract consists of choosing in order to
maximize:
subject to 3. From the rst order condition, we obtain that
, which implies that (Ex-post eﬃciency).
Finally, using in 3, it can be seen immediately that
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If then the rst order conditions 14 and 15 hold and both
imply that but no further restriction is placed on the optimal
contract. As a result there is a continuum of solutions. Using 3, it can be
conrmed that these solutions include and
Let us prove Remark 4 for the case . The same method can be applied
for any value of
Suppose that is revealed at the end of any period with probability
If is revealed at the end of then as in the text
the ex-post eﬃcient separation rule at the beginning of is
Under ex-post eﬃciency, the expected present value of eﬃciency units that
a worker delivers if she takes a new job at the beginning of is given
by:
Note that The optimal separation rule at the beginning of
if has been revealed is:
Hence, Under ex-post eﬃciency, the expected present value of
eﬃciency units that a worker delivers if she takes a new job at the beginning
of is given by:
Note that As in Proposition 1 equilibrium contracts can
achieve both ex-post eﬃciency and wage smoothing (and full insurance). By
let us denote the (constant) wage in a contract for remaining periods,
Thus, a three-period contract species where is
the severance payment that the worker obtains if laid oﬀ at the beginning
of period In order to implement ex-post eﬃciency it must be the
case that:
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In equilibrium, rms must be indiﬀerent between hiring workers in the
third period of their lives and those in their rst period. This arbitrage
condition can be written as:
Let us rst show that From the cut-oﬀ points, we have that:
Using the denitions of and and manipulating:
Thus, the sign of is positive if where
Let us check the latter condition:
Thus, the function is convex because the inverse of the likelihood
ratio has been assumed to be negative. As a result, will attain its
maximum at Applying lH pitals rule:
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Therefore, Next, let us show that From the equation
associated with the implementation of the optimal we have that:
Note that is higher than when learning takes place only at the end
of the rst period in a new job and that the separation rule when learning
takes place is Hence,
Assume that and that each individual worker in the second
period will have access to a wage equal to where is distributed over
according to . Ex-post eﬃciency requires
that the worker be retained if and only if The rm res the worker
if and only if where:
The worker quits if and only if where .
The arbitrage condition can be written as:
Since capital markets are perfect the worker only cares about the ex-
pected present value of her income:
27
cc c
c
∫
 ∫  ∫
∫
1 2
2
2
2
2
2
 

| 

   
 
  





  
8.5 Proof of Remark 6
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Using the arbitrage condition we can rewrite the workers utility:
The rst order conditions fully characterize from where
can be recovered:
(16)
Condition 16 is satised if and only if which implies that .
We show that unless the worker obtains with probability one,
the outcome of bargaining will be characterized by excessive layoﬀs. First,
notice that workers will be dismissed whenever . Indeed, if this is the
case a rm would only retain the worker if , but the worker
would only accept . Also, when the worker is dismissed then
the rm will not pay more than (individual rationality). We only need to
show that if the probability of employment with the rm is when ,
then the worker obtains with probability 1 as well.
Thus, any bargaining mechanism will result in a probability of trade
(employment) and (possibly) some transfers between parties, say from rm
to worker, both (possibly) a function of the type . Let represent the
expected transfer from rm to worker. Let represent the expected
probability of employment. In this bargaining process, we can evaluate
the value (surplus) of one eﬃciency unit of labor at its market value, .
Finally, let represent the expected payoﬀ for the rm for a given
realization of . That is,
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Incentive compatibility of the rm requires that for all
and
Since eﬃciency implies that for all , these conditions trans-
late into
for all . Therefore, the transfer from rm to worker must be
constant for all . Finally, for , a rm should not prefer laying
the worker oﬀ, and then .
Equations 2, 3 and 9 determine for given values of (
Manipulating these equations it can be shown that if and only if
where is given by:
In the case that is uniformly distributed, and then according
to equation 7, we have that and
Workers make their oﬀers to maximize 6, whether is positive or not,
and whether they borrow or save. On the other hand, rms ring decisions
still satisfy 2. Thus, 7 still describes the equilibrium ring decisions.
Assume that the solution to 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 9 gives and this is not
feasible. Also assume that when setting equations 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 still
hold but we have that where satises:
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Here we use the fact that the savings/borrowings are non zero.
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That is, the non negativity condition on is binding (workers would
prefer negative severance payments) but imperfections in the capital market
are not too great, so that workers use the less eﬀective substitute which is
borrowing (negative savings).
Note that from 10, . Also note that in the absence of public in-
tervention . That is, an increase in and from their zero levels will
induce higher eﬃciency in the use of labor (higher output in equilibrium).
Workers are smoothing their consumption (at the rate given by ), both
before and after the policy change. Thus, total welfare unambiguously in-
creases: there exists a monetary transfer from rms to workers that leaves
both workers and rms better oﬀ.
As an example of such a transfer, consider the following. Each worker
receives a subsidy of when young and a subsidy
of when old, where
That is, they are compensated in their wages for the loss they would have
incurred from lower spot market wages, had the cut-oﬀ level not changed.
With this complementary transfer, we compute the change in utility of the
worker due to an increase in (and, correspondingly, ) when . Using
the envelope theorem, so that , this eﬀect is:
where , and
. Taking derivatives, we obtain
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where this last equality follows from 11 at . Thus, since , we
conclude that this transfer renders the eﬀect on the utility of the worker
positive. The transfer may be nanced by a lump sum tax on rms prots.
Indeed, the net wage bill per worker (including the lump sum tax and the
hiring/ring tax/subsidies) then increases by
which equals the increase in the value of eﬃciency units per worker ob-
tained:
an equality that again follows from 11. QED
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